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CASE COMMENTS
ATToniEY AND CLNT--ATTORNY IS ANiOrriCER O THE COURT, AND,
WHEE THE RECORD ON WHICH HE RELrEs HAS BEEN CHANIGED HE OWES
THE COURT A DUTY To USE DILIGENCE TO SEE THAT IT IS TRUE AND CoRnEr.

-Respondent was before the court to show why he should not be punished for contempt for making certain changes in a transcript filed In
the instant court. Held, rul6 discharged; that the evidence was Insufficient to show that the changes were made by or at the instance of respondent; however, that the interlineations in the transcript were so
awkwardly made that the respondent owed the court a duty to see that
they were correct and made by the officers of the court. He, having
failed to so act, constrains the court-to reprimand. Sparks v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 221, 8 (2d) S. W. 397.
The instant holding is in accord with Rice v. Commonwealth, 57
Ky. (B. Mon.) 472, an early case on the point, which held, that the
alteration by an attorney of a letter that was to be used in a court as
evidence, was sufficient ground to disbar him from practice. Again,
in Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 592, the rule was invoked.
There Is an unbroken line of dcisions in the Kentucky Reports in accord with the instant holding.
The rule finds support in many other jurisdictions. In In Re Bergerson, 220 Mass. 472, 107 N. E. 1007, Ann. Cas. 1917 A., it was held:
"An attorney is an officer of the state binding him to the highest fidelity
to the court, and sustaining obligations to the public no less significant
than those to his clients."
An attorney is an officer of the state owing duties to his clients and
the court. To discharge these duties properly requires the exercise of
keen discrimination, and, when the interest of his client, and the interest of the public conflict, as an officer of the court, he must yield to
the latter. He therefore occupies what may be called a quasi-judicial
office. Langen v. Barkawski, 188 Wis. 277, 206 N. W. 181; In ReMaresk's Will, 177 Wis. 194, 187 N. W. 1009. An Oregon statute makes
an attorney an officer of the court. In Re Crum, 103 Or. 296, 204 Pac.
948.
An attorney, who, while transporting a memorandum from one
court to another, altered it, for the purpose of deceiving the latter court,
was disbarred. Matter of Lundy, 14 Oh. Cir. Ct. 561, 8 Oh. Cir. Dec.
111. In Matter of Houghton, 67 Cal. 511, 8 P. 52, a case on all fours
with the instant case, it was held, as did the Kentucky court, that where
It Is not clear that the attorney aid intend to state a falsehood, and
thereby deceive the court, there is no ground for disbarment.
Attorneys are officers of the court. Their high vocations are to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts before it, and to aid
it In doing justice and arriving at just conclusions. They violate their
oaths of office when they resort to deception or allow their clients to so
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do.
Zeo v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 27 N. E. 1096; People v. Barrios, 237
Ill. 527, 86 N. E. 1075.
Thaicker v. United ,States, 212 F. 801, 129 C. C. A. 255; Gelders v.
Haywood, 182 P. 109; and Exparte Cole, 6 F. Cas. 2973, 1 McCray 405, are
adequate to show the United States federal courts to be in accord with
the Kentucky decisions. However, disbarment in a federal court does
not restrain practice in state courts.
It is submitted that the holding in the present case is sound on
principle, supported by unanimous authority, and is very desirable in
C. M. S.
results.

Bnms AND NorEs-DErT IS PRESUMED CRESTED SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH THE EXECUTION OF NOTE TmEEFOR, WHERE REPLY CoNTovERTED
CLAIMS OF PRIOR EXISTING INDEBTEDNESS, AND NO PROOF TAxEN.-PrIor
to making the note in question the maker, defendant, was indebted to
plaintiff. By many summary conveyances he deeded away his land to
third persons, some before and some after the execution of the note to
plaintiff; the facts do not disclose the nature of the debt, nor the conditions under which the note was executed. However, the contention was
made that not only were the conveyances subsequent to the execution
void, because with intent to defraud creditors, but also those prior
thereto for the same reason. Held: Where there is only an allegation
that a note was given for a prior existing debt, but no proof taken, the
presumption is that the debt was created simultaneously with the execution of the note, and therefore only those conveyances after the execution are void. Cornett v. Brashear, 225 Ky. 526, 9 (2d) S. W. 302.
The subject of the main suit involved only the liability on the
note. However, a subsidiary question was whether or not the plaintiff
could have levied on the property conveyed prior to the execution of
the note. There is no question but that the subsequent conveyances
can be avoided. The effect of plaintiff's contention places him in the
awkward position of asserting that the note was not given for value,
and at the same time asking judgment on it. This must be the effect
of the contention since if the note was given in place of the old debt,
so that the new promise would support the present suit all rights must
have been merged in the note. The theory upon thip point is that the
promise to release all claims under the old debt is' the consideration
for the new, and the creditor thereby becomes a purchaser for value.
Platt v. Beebe, 57 N. Y. 339; Manning v. McClure, 36 Il1. 490; Wi~ley v.
Cobb, 165 Mass. 503, 43 N. E. 497; Brown v. North, 21 Mo. 528; Lumberg
v. N. W. Elevator Co., 42 Minn. 37, 43 N. W. 685; McCabe v. Conner, 68
Mich. 182, 35 N. W. 901. Upon these authorities it would seem to follow that the plaintiff could not claim anything on the prior debt, while
at the same time suing on the new promise. On the other hand if the
note was merely security, or a conditional payment, he could not sue
on the note because he would not have been a bona fide holder, no consideration having been given.

CASE COMMENTs
The Kentucky rule upon this point was decided in the early case
Gilmore v. Green, 77 Ky. 772. The court there held that a new promise
to pay a pre-existing debt would not support an action, but that where
it was shown to have been the intention of the parties for the new
promise to take the place of the old, such suit could be maintained. This
rule was again applied in Groves v. McGuise, 79 Ky. 536. The case at
bar combines the rule that bills and notes will be presumed to have
been given for value and thereby concludes that a note given for a prior
debt, unless proven otherwise, will be presumed created at the time of
the execution of the new note.
Upon this proposition the Supreme Court of the United States
seems to be much more liberal. Judge Story in the case of Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Peters, 19, 10 L. Ed. 872, declared such payment of a note or
other security to be a valuable consideration, a benefit to both parties
and to the commercial world, as probably more than one-half of all bank
transactions were of this character, and that a contrary doctrine would
strike a fatal blow to all discounts of negotiable securities for preexisting debts. This view was affirmed in Prentice v. Zane, 8 Howard
W. H. C.
468, 12 L. Ed. 1160.

CoNsTITUTIoNAL

LAw-STATE

STATUTE TAXING RECORDING OF MORT-

GAGES RuuznNG LEss THAN FrvE YEARs HELD ViOLTrivE OF EQUAL PROTEoTiON CLAusE AS ARBITuARY CLAssmATioN-Thls case arose under
the Kentucky Statute of 1922, Article 496, Section 4019a-9, which places
a tax of twenty cents upon each one hundred dollars of indebtedness
secured by mortgage, provided such mortgage does not mature within
five years and is- placed on record. The plaintiff was a large corporation which recorded a mortgage of eighteen million dollars. The tax
was paid under protest. The court in reversing a decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals held the tax invalid as an infringement on the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Louisville
Gas & Electric Go. v. Coleman, State Auditor, 48 Sup. Ct. 423.
This case was decided by a five to four vote. The point raised was
simply how far a legislature may go in making classifications before
they will be considered unjust and arbitrary, and deny the one discriminated against the equal protection of the laws. A statute which
treated owners of real estate under which were minerals materially different from one who had no minerals under his land was held to be
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. State v. Donald,
161 Wis. 188, 153 N. W. 238. The classification must not be arbitrary
or whimsical but must be founded upon real differences of situatioa
and condition affording rational grounds for the difference In treatment.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. State, 163 Wis. 484, 155 N.
W. 609. A tax on stockholders in a railroad specially chartered was
held invalid. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co. v. Fuller,205 Federal 86. A
statute which imposed a poll tax on alien Inhabitants alone was held to
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be in violation of the due process clause. Ex Parte Kotta, 187 Calif.
27, 200 Pac. 957. A statute which provided for special tax on corporations with mo par value stock but taxed other corporations on their
capital stock and surplus was held unconstitutional. Southwestern Bell
Telephone &o. v. Middlekamp, I Federal, (2nd) 563. A statute provided
that a certain sum should be paid to the clerk of the probate court for
placing an estate upon the docket proportionate to the amount of the
estate. The court held the tax unconstitutional, on the ground that it
paid different amounts for the same work. Cook Co. v. Fairbanks,222
Ill. 578, 78 N. F. 895.
There are cases contra to this in both the United States Supreme
Court reports and In those of the state courts but there are "few where
the discrimination is as pronounced and arbitrary as it appears in the
instant case. Telephone companies with an earning of five hundred
dollars were subject to an ad valorem tax while those who earned less
were exempt under a statute which was upheld. Citizens Telephone Co.
v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322. A statute was upheld which imposed a license
charge of one thousand dollars on theaters where the admission was
one dollar or more but only four hundred dollars on one which charged
less than one dollar. Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61.
An act which imposed a tax of two per cent on the premiums paid to
sick and funeral insurance companies was held not to be unjust nor an
arbitrary discrimination. PeninsularIndustrialIns. a. v. State, 61 Fla.
376, 55 So. 398.
After carefully review.ng the authorities it appears that the case
in question is supported by the majority of the courts and it is likewise
supported by good reason.
G. C. R.

CouNTIxs-CouNTIES MAY RECOVER ILEGA.LLY PAI) CLr&ms, THOUGH
ALL OwED BY THE FISCAL COURT AND PAID nY TRmAsu=r.-Appellee, a
county treasurer, had disobeyed the fiscal court's order by paying
illegal claims on debts which the county had incurred at a prior date.
In reversing a judgment in favor of the appellee the court held, that
even though the fiscal court had allowed an Illegal claim and the county
treasurer had paid it, the county can recover from the one wrongfully
receiving the money. Pulaski County et al. v. Richarclsan, County
Treasureret al., 225 Ky. 556, 9 (2d) S. W. 556.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in allowing a recovery on an
illegally paid claim upholds a long line of prior decisions of the same
nature. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81, 85 S. W. 514; Commonwealth. v.
Richmond, 148 Ky. 849, 147 S. W. 913; Elliot et al. v. Commonwealth,
144 Ky. 335, 138 S. W. 300; Hopkins v. Givens, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 993, 96
S. W. 819.
Where the fiscal court refuses to take action to recover sums illegally paid by it, a citizen and taxpayer of the county may maintain
a suit in the name of the county to recover the amount. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81, 85 S. W. 514. Also, a county may maintain an action
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to recover against a member of the fiscal court who has purchased a
claim against the county where a statute prohibits the purchase of a
claim against the county by a member of the court. Logan County v.
Head, 206 Ky. 97, 266 S. W. 883. A taxpayer may recover against the
sheriff funds paid to him illegally by the fiscal court. Shipp v. Rodes,
196 Ky. 523, 245 S. W. 197.
Where the county commissioners have misconstrued a statute and
allowed a clerk traveling expenses when they were not due him, the
adjudication is not conclusive on the county. Norfolk County v. Cook,
211 Mass. 390, 97 N. E. 778. Nor has a board of supervisors the power
to audit adid allow an account not legally chargeable to the county.
Richmond County v. Ellis, 59 N. Y. 620.
Mloney paid voluntarily, however, by the fiscal court in the absence
of fraud, illegality, or mistake can not be recovered back, although the
county at the time the claim was allowed, may have had proper grounds
for refusing payment. Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 148 Ky. 561,
147 S. W. 31.
There is no question but that the holding of the! court in the present case is in line with the adjudications in the other jurisdictions and
conforms to a long line of decisions of its own. Sustained by so much
authority and for the pr6tection it affords the taxpayer, the decision
is unquestionably correct.
H. C. C.

Cnnn.N
LAw-PERson Is Ax "Accomtr.PxCn
3F SO PARTICWATING On
AIDING IN .OFFENSE AS TO AUTHORIZE HIS CONVTION AS PRINCIPAL Ot
Anmm.-Defendant F was convicted with H of the offense of unlawfully
transporting intoxicatink liquors. F's automobile was! used in the commission of the offense. D, an accomplice, testified as to this and his
testimony was corroborated by H. The court Instructed the jury that
this evidence by D would be insufficient unless corroborated by other
evidence, and that the corroboration is insufficient if it merely shows
that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof. D
asked for an instruction for acquittal because of the insufficiency of the
evidence to make him an "accomplice." Held: F was an accomplice.
Fryman v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 808, 10 (2nd) S. W. 302.
Everyone is a party to an offense who either actually commits the
offense or does some act which forms a part thereof, or assists in the
actual commission thereof, or directly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to commit the offense or any act forming a part of
the offense. State v. Scott, 80 Conn. 317, 68 A. 258. In felonies the
participants are divided into two general classes: (1) principals in
first degree, and (2) principals in second degree. United States v
Martin, 176 F. 110; Wiliams v. State, 41 Ark. 173; Rex v. Royce, 4 Burr.
2073, 98 Reprint 81. A Principal in the second degree, or "accomplice,'"
is one who is present actually or constructively, aiding and abetting
in the commission of the felony. Jolly v. State, 94 Ala. 19, 10 So. 606;
Able v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush (Ky.) 698; Pierce v. State,, 130 Tenn,

298

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

24, 168 S. W. 851; State v. Boysen, 30 Wash. 338, 70 P. 740. At common
law the accomplice must .have been present, actually or constructively
at the time and place of the commission of the crime. Also at common
law an "accomplice" included all particeps criminis, whether they were
principals In first or second degree, or mere accessories before or after
the fact. People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 704.
The test applied by the court in the Instant case is the universally
accepted one. An accomplice is one who in some degree is involved in
the offense charged, and who may be indicted for the same offense for
which the prindipal.is tried. Raum v. Board of Council of City of Danvinle, 155 Ky. 690, 160 S. W. 255; Brinegarv. State, 82 Neb. 588, 118 N.
W. 475; Maggard v. State, 90 Okl. Cr. 265, 131 P. 549; State v. Weston,
109 Ore. 19, 219 P. 180; United States v. Neverson, 1 Mackey, 152;
United States v. Henry, 4 Wash. C. C. 428, Federal 4 ase No. 15351.
The mere presence of one when a crime Is committed does not
make him an "accomplice," but to do so he must have knowingly, voluntarily, and with common interest united with the principal in the commission of the crime. Hicks v. State, 126 Tenn. 359, 149 S. W. 1055;
Maggard v. State, supra; Howard v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 270, 233 S. W.
847. An intent to commit an offense or to aid in the commission
thereof is essential to render one an "accomplice." State v. Yates, 181
Ia. 539, 164 N. W. 798; Hicks v. State, supra; Howard v. State, supra.
There is a conflict of authority as to the question whether there
is a distinction between an "accomplice" as a witness and as a defendant. State v. Case, 61 Ore., 265, 122 P. 304, and State v. Weston, 109
Ore. 16, 219 P. 180, hold there is no distinction between the two. Some
courts place a broader significance on the former than on the latter.
An "accomplice" In relation to his use as a witness means any criminal connection of the witness with the matter in trial, either as a
principal, accomplice, accessory, or receiver of stolen property. An
accomplice in the crime means one who either as a principal, accomplice, or accessory Is connected with the crime by an unlawful act or
omission on his part, transpiring either before, at the time of, or after
the commission of the offense, and whether or not he was present and
participated in the offense. Goldstein v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. B. 622, 166
S. W. 149. Whether or not a witness is an accomplice of the accused
is for the determination of the jury on conflicting evidence, but for the
court where his acts and conduct are admitted. People v. Coffey, supra;
Re Bowe, 77 F. 161.
W. C. W.

DuEnss-THR=AT OF SUTr, UNLEss BANK CASHIER ExEcuTED DEEDS
To GUARANTEE PAYMENT or CERTAIN NorEs DIscoUNTED, WAs IrVsurxrCIENT TO RLmv
Hnr, WHERE HE ExEcUTED DEms.-Appellant, as
cashier of a bank, discounted certain notes which the bank examiner
held bad. Appellee, with other directors of the bank, contended that
appellant was liable to the bank for discounting notes without good
and sufficient surety. Both sides employed counsel and a compromise
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was effected whereby appellant executed deeds to the directors to secure the notes in dispute. Appellant was to have use of the agencies
of the bank for collection, was to have credit for all payments on same
and at the end of a stipulated period an assignment of notes remaining unpaid. In an action to secure the cancellation of his deeds to the
directors on the ground of duress the court held that there was no
duress; that there was good consideration for the execution of the
deeds and that the appellees be adjudged to have a lien on appellant's
land for the payment of such notes. Northcutt et ux. v. Highftill et al.,
225 Ky. 456, 9 (2nd) S. W. 209.
It Is a well established rule that it is not duress to institute or
threaten to institute civil suits, or take proceedings in court, or for any
person to declare that he intends to use the courts wherein to insist
upon what he believes to be his legal rights. U. H. Banking Co. v.
Veale, 84 Kan. 385, 114 Pac. 229, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 540; Hilborm v.
Bucknam, 78 Me. 482, 7 Atl. 272; Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. (Mass.)
125, 54 Am. Dec. 716, 9 R. C. L., Sect. II, 722.
As early as 1808, the Kentucky court in the case of Edw~ards v.
Handley, 3 Hardin (Ky.) 615, laid down a rule to this effect; "Menace
of corporal pain shall avoid a deed; but menace of his goods shall not."
And in Hazelrigg v. Donaldson, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 445, "Duress that will
avoid a deed is that which compels the grantor through personal restraint or fear of personal injury or imprisonment, to do what he
would not do voluiitarily," and again in the case of Harris, Speakes d
Harrisv. Kriegle, 197 Ky. 50, 245 S. W. 866, "Duress which will relieve
one from an obligation arises from a threat of personal injury putting
one In fear, and not from a threat of litigation."
The following statement is representative of the undisputed rule
in this cquntry: "To constitute 'undue influence' so as to render a deed
invalid, the mind of the grantor must be so controlled or affected by
persuasion or pressure, artful or fraudulent contrivances, or by insiduous influences of persons In close confidential relations with grantor
so that he is not left to act intelligently, understandingly, and .voluntarily, but subject to the will or purpose of another." Peacock v. DuBois, 90 Florida 162, 105 So. 321. And the mere fact that plaintiff entered into a compromise reluctantly or in order to avoid the trouble or
expense of a lawsult, does not amount to intimidation or duress.
Andrews v. Connelly, 145 Fed. 43; Satchfleld v. Laconia Levee Dist.,
74 Ark. 270, 85 S. W. 409; Kiler v. Wohletz, 79 Kan. 716, 101 Pac. 474, L.
R. A. 1915B 11; Layer v. Layer, 184 Mich 663, 151 N. W. 759; Dunham
v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224, 3 N. E. 76. The perfectly obvious reason for
the rule is that it can never constitute duress merely to threaten to do
what a party has a legal right to do.
It has also been held that where the grantee did not instigate or
have knowledge of the duress, a deed may not be avoided for duress by
others. Wells Fargo Nevada Nat'l Bank of San Franciscov. Barnette,
298 Fed. 689.
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To establish duress the evidence must show, facts reasonably adequate to overcome the will of the party making the compromise. Andrews v. Connelly, supra; Kiler v. Wohletz, supra; Galusha v. Sherman,
105 Wis. 263, 81 N. W. 495, 47 L. R. A. 417.
It is broi4ght out, in the case at bar, that there was a dispute as to
appellant's liability to the bank on the notes in question; that both
sides employed counsel and a compromise was effected which resulted
in the execution of the deeds which appellant Is seeking to cancel. In
view of this statement of the case, and applying the unquestioned doctrines of the law of duress, there is not the slightest grounds for a disposition of this point 'in the case other than that adopted 'by the court.
C. E. B.
HOMICIDE-FAILURE TO INsTRucT THA THE Tin
BErwEEN PnEVIous
DiIuLTY AND SHOOTING WAS INADEQUATE "COOLING Thin" HELD NOT
PREJUDICIAL WHERE

DEFENDANT

WAS

CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER.-

Appellant had been struck by the deceased with an ax handle. He left
the place of difficulty and obtained a shot gun, returned to tlie scene
and immediately shot and killed his adversary. Appellant was indicted
for murder, but at the trial was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal
it was contended that it was prejudicial error for the trial court not to
instruct that the time between the altercation and shooting was inadequate "cooling time." Held, that as appellant was convicted of manslaughter and not murder, the failure to so instruct was not prejudicial.
Highbargerv. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 302, 10 (2nd) S. W. 286.
Under section 263 of the Civil Code of Kentucky, where the indictment is for murder, the accused may be convicted of any degree of
homicide as fixed by common law, viz.: murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter. Buckner v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush
601, 77 Ky. 601; Horseman v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 818, 110 S. W.
236. An offense which'would otherwise be murder becomes voluntary
manslaughter where the jury find that the killing was not done with
malice aforethought Zeltner v. State, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. P. 102; Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 69 Atl. 891, 123 Am. St. Rep. 699.
Where a court is requested to instruct that the accused did the act
in the heat of passion or before he had time to "cool" off, it is in effect
requesting a verdict for manslaughter. #ocker v. Commonwealth, 33
Ky. Law Rep. 944, 111 S.W. 676; Marshbanks v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. Rep.
507, 192 S. W. 246; State v. Rennison, 306 Mo. 473, 267 S. W. 850.
It is reversible error not to instruct as to a lesser degree of offense
of which there is some evidence, such as to create a reasonable doubt.
Breeden v. Commonwealth, 151 Ky. 217, 151 S. W. 407; State v. Trusty,
118 Iowa 498, 92 N. W. 677. However, it is not reversible error where
the trial court refused or failed to give an instruction, when the verdict
shows that the defendant was not prejudiced thereby. State v. Beel,
170 N. C. 764, 87 S. E. 416; People v. Frindel, 58 Hun. 482, 12 N. Y. S.
498.
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Clearly the court's ruling that the verdict cured the trial court's
error in failing to instruct as requested is in keeping with good sense
and the better law. While it is true that the trial court erred, yet it
is a needless expense for the Commonwealth to go into another trial
when defendant's case could not possibly have been prejudiced thereby.
H. C. C.
INFANTS-MINOR, WHOSE FATHER SUED IN His BEH.ALF As NExT
FnmIEN, HLr
ENTITLED TO DAxAGE;s FOR IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY
BEouu ATTAINING M&jorry.--C, a minor, was injured because of the
negligence of the defendant city inthe upkeep of a bridge. The injury
became infected, and C became permanently disabled. C sues through
his father as next friend, and the father later filed a petition to be made
a party plaintiff. Defendant contended that C was entitled to recover
for the lifipairment of earning capacity after he reached majority, and
that the father was entitled to loss of services as well as for impairment of earning capacity before majority. Held: C was entitled to
the loss of services and the impairment of earning capacity both after
and before reaching majority. City of Pineville v. Lawson, 225 Ky.
542, 9 (2nd) S: W. 517.
The general rule is thata minor owing services to his parents cannot recover damages for loss of services or diminshed earning capacity,
during minority, resulting from a personal injury, since those items of
damage ordinarily belong to the parent and not to the minor. Farrar
v. Wheeler, (1906) 145 F. 482. Peppercorn v. Blac7 River Falls, 80
Wis. 38, 61 N. W. 79; Nemorafskie v. InterurbanStreet R. Co., 87 1I. Y.
Supp. 463. But when a child is injured permanently, as in the instant
case, two Tights of action accrue, one in the father for the loss of
services until the child reaches majority, and the other in the child for
his pain and suffering and the impairment of earning capacity after
majority. Louisville, H. & St. Louis By. Co. v. Lyons, 156 Ky. 222, 160
S. W. 942. A minor cannot recover for loss of time, loss of wages, or
decreased earning capacity during minority. Chicago, S. B. & N. Q. By
Co. v. Seaman, 182 Ind. 370, 105 N. E. 234. A child may recover for
pain and suffering during minority. Murphy v. Ludowice Gas i Oil
Co., 96 Kan. 321, 150 P. 581; C. X. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v Troxell, 143 Ky.
765, 137 S. W. 543.
There are exceptions to the general rule, one of which is the basis
for the decision in the instant case: (1) If the minor can show that
his earnings belong to himself and not to his father then he can recover for loss of services, wages, and diminished earning capacity. The
minor does this by showing that he is emancipated. Atlanta & T. P.
R. Co. v. Smith, 94 Ga. 107, 208 S. E. 763; Chicago, S. B. & N. I. By. Co.
v. Seaman, supra; Douleut & Williams v. Hoffman, (1920) 204 Ala. 33,
86 So. 73. (2) Where the father waives his right to sue after suit is
brought in behalf of the infant. A waiver of the father's right of
action is shown where the suit is brought in the name of the minor by
the father as guardian or next friend for bntire damages, which include
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loss of services, loss of wages, pain and suffering, and impairment of
earning capacity both before and after maturity. Zongker v. People's
Union Mercantile Co., 110 Mo. App. 382, 86 S. W. 486; Daly v. Everett
Pulp and Paper Co. 31 Wash. 252, 71 P. 1014; Baker v. Flint and P. M.
R. Co., 9 Mich. 298, 51 N. W. 897; C. N. 0. and T. P. R. Co. v. Trozell,
supra; C. & 0. R. Co. v. Davis, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1153, 58 S. W. 698. Thils
exception to the general rule is the basis for the decision in the principal case. In the instant case the father waived his right of action by
joining in the action in behalf of the infant It must be clearly shown
that the father intended to relinquish his cause of action. Slaughter
v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co., 28 Ky. L. Rep. 665. The
waiver may be made before as well as after the commencement of in.
fant's right of action. Jud 'V.Ballard, 66 Vt. 668, 30 A. 96.
W. C. W.

INsuRANcE-aE=u

PAYIENT, TENDERED ATER DuE RECEIVED

A.WD RETAINED BY INsUREa oN CONDITION, HELD BINDING ON INSURE,,
WHERE CONDITION WAS NOT COMMUNICATED TO on ASSENTED TO BY IN.

SURED.-Appellee was beneficiary of a life policy issued by appellant,
then due, if valid. The policy contained a clause incurring a forfeiture
in the event the premium was not paid on November 21, or thirty days
thereafter. Appellee averred and proved that the insured tendered the
premium on December 30, and that appellant accepted and retaified the
payment, communicating no condition of acceptance, and that the insured never assented to any condition of acceptance. Held, that acceptance and retention of the premium by appellant, without communicat4ng to insured any condition of acceptance, though the policy had
lapsed because of failure of insured to remit the premium within the
limited time, would bind it on the policy. Equity Life Insurance Co.
of United States v. Brewer, 225 Ky. 472, 9 S. W. (2d) 206.
The present holding is in accord with the adjudications of former
Kentucky courts upon the question raised. In Citizens' National Insurancd Co. v. Egner, 167 Ky. 478, 180 S. W. 778, a case involving a
policy and facts similar to those before the instant court, it was held,
that since the insurer had accepted and retained the premium upon a
policy, lapsed because of failure to pay premium, without bringing
home to insured any condition of acceptance, the policy was reinstated
ipso facto, and the insurer could not avoid liability. However, it Is
just as well established in this state that a conditional acceptance of a
premium upon a lapsed policy may be binding on the insured, if the
condition on which the premium is accepted is communicated by the
insurer. This burden is wholly upon the insurer. And nothing less
than actual notice will suffice. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Price, 117 Ky. 25, 77 S. W. 384.
Kentucky is In accord with the general rule and weight of
authority in the United States. The New York Appellate Court in
Gould v. Equitable Life Assurance Association of the United States,
231 N. Y. 208, 131 N. E. 289, in reversing a lower court on the point,
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said: "Had there been no notice to the insured of a conditional acceptance the holding would have been sound." Other decisions expressing the same view are: Hodadon v. Guardian Life Insurance Co..
97 Mass. 114, 93 Am. Dec. 73; Insurance Co. v. Waif, 95 U. S. 326;
Phoenix Life Insurance Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183, 30 L. Ed. 644.
Missouri goes further than Kentucky and the general rule. It was
held in Andros v. Insurance Co., 168 Mo. 151, 67 S. W. 582, that evel
though communication of a conditional acceptance was made by the
insurer to the insured, the acceptance and retention of payment would
operate to renew the policy. Reid v. Banker's Union, 121 Mo. App. 419,
99 S. W. 55, expressed a like opinion.
The instant holding is in accord with prior decisions in Kentucky,
the weight of authority, and the trend of development in insurance law,
all of which have evolved out of a necessary respect and distinction
brought about by the growing needs for insurance facilities. Insurers
and insured are equally protected and benefited thereby.
C. S. M.
MINES AND MInERAis-WHEuE LESsEE PAID STIPULATED OIL ROYAL.
RIGHT TO USE CASING HEAD GAS ON OR OFF ThE PREMISES.Defendant was the lessee under an oil and gas lease, by the terms of
which the plaintiff, as lessor, granted and demised to him all of the oil
and gas under the described land, with the right to use said oil and
gas. It was further agreed that in case oil should be found in paying
quantities, lessee was to pay a one-eighth royalty to the lessor, and i
stipulated rental was also to be paid upon any gas well which should
produce gas in paying quantities. Three oil wells were drilled, and oil
was produced in sufficient quantities to market. The defendant piped
the casing head gas from one of these wells off of the premises and
used it for pumping wells on other leases. All oil royalties were
promptly paid,-and no gas was produced in paying quantities. Plaintiff brings this action for the value of the casing head gas used off the
premises. Held, that such gas was the property of the lessee, since he
had complied with all of the express terms of the lease. Midsouth Oil
Co. v. Cochran, 225 Ky. 676, 9 (2d) S. W. 1004.
This decision is illustrative of the confusion which characterizes
the decisions of practically all the courts on the subject of the status
of casing head gas. There have not been a great many decisions by
appellate courts in which the question has been considered, and it can
be clearly said that the law is vague and indefinite.
By what appears to be the majority rule, in the absence of express
stipulation, casing head gas is classified as "oil." Wempie v. Producers'
Oil Go., 145 La. 1031, 83 So. 232. This rule is followed by Texas and the
Federal courts, ahd seems to be the most logical. Livingston Oil Corp.
v. Waggoner (Texas Civ. Appeals) 273 S. W. 903; Twin Hills Gasoline
Co. v. Bradford, 264 Fed. 440. It is logical that the lessor in the usual
oil and gas lease is not entitled to a yearly gas well rental from an oil
well producing casing head gas from which gasoline is refined. Locke
v. Russell, 75 W. Va. 602, 84 S. E. 948; Twin Hills Gasoline Co. v. BradTIES, IT HAD
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fordo, supra. Casing head gas is usually used in the manufacture of
gasoline, and most of the courts, in the absence of express stipulation
-in the lease, allow the usual oil royalty. Wemple v. Producers' Oil Co.
sutpra; Gilbreath v. States Oil Corp., 4 Fed. (2d) 232. But it has been
held, in the case of a sale of oil, gas, and mineral rights, obligating the
purchaser to deliver one-eighth of all oil produced, that casing head
gas was not included. Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607. It is
difficult to see how this case can be reconciled with Wemple v. Producers' Oil Co., supra, a case from the same jurisdiction.
The Oklahoma courts, however, take a different view, and in the
later decisions, seem to class casing head gas as "gas." WolJf v. Black,
well Oil & Gas Co., 77 Ok. 81, 186 Pac. 484"; Paulter v. Franchot, 108
Old. 130, 235 Pac. 209. It is difficult to tell from some of the cases
whether the courts look upon it as either, within the terms of the usual
oil and gas leases. Hammett v. Gypsy Oil Co., 95 Old. 234, 218 Pac.
501, 34 A. L. R. 275.
In the instant case the Court of Appeals seems to reach its decision from a construction of the terms of the lease, but it seems clear
that casing head gas is regarded as gas, and not as oil. It must be
noted that the defendant did not attempt to manufacture gasoline from
the gas, but merely used it for pumping purposes, presumably in its
gaseous state. It was conceded by both parties that there were no gas
wells within the meaning of the lease. It is difficult to tell what the
court's decision would have been had the case turned upon this point.
W. C. S.
MUNIcIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs-CoNSTITUTOIAL LrEITATION ON MUNICiPAL INDEBTEDNESS CANNOT BE AVOIDED BY INSTALLMENT PAYrMNTS.-Bill

by taxpayers to restrain city from entering into contract to lease additional electrical power machinery for stipulated monthly rentals to
be evidenced by city warrants due and payable as the rent became due,
with option to purchase the equipment at the end of the term at the
price of $1.00. Such contract was made in order to evade the effect of the
State Constitution, Section 157, limiting. municipal indebtedness. Held:
that such obligations would constitute a present indebtedness within
the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution and in an amount forbidden by that section and that such provision could not be avoided by
providing for installment payments running through a series of years.
Jones v. RutherfoZ et al., (Ky.), 10 (2nd) S. W. 296.
Section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution provides, in effect that
"No city, town, or other municipality . . . shall be permitted to
become, indebted . . . to an amount exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year, wtthout the assent of twothirds of the voters thereof . . . and any indebtedness contracted
in violation of this section shall be void .
.
The above quoted provision or similar ones have been embodied,
either in constitutions or statutes, in many states, notably Kentucky,
-Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. Such a restric-
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tion Is also contained in the constitutions of California and Idaho, in
which states there is no other fixed debt limit. McQuillin, Municipal.
Corporations, (2nd Ed.) Vol. 6, Section 2365. It would seem that the
primary purpose of such provisions is to compel municipalities to adopt
the safe, sane and conservative plan of "pay as you go," and that each
year's income and revenue must pay each year's indebtedness and liabilities and also that no indebtedness and liability incurred in any one
year shall be paid out of the income and revenue of any future year.

The case of Bradford v. Fiscal Court of Bracken County, 159 Ky.
544, 167 S. W. 937, presents a good interpretation of that section of the
Kentucky Constitution referred to. There the court held that it was
not contemplated by the Constitution that a county, even for the purpose of building a courthouse, shall, without a vote of the people, create
in one year, a debt to be paid in subsequent years, and for the payment of which no provision can -be made out of the income and revenue
provided for the year in which the indebtedness is created. Again, in
the case of Flandersv. Board of Trustees of Little Rock Graded.School,
170 Ky. 627, 186 S. W. 506, it was held that the creation of a debt by a
municipality, without the assent of two-thirds of the voters, was void
as in violation of Section 157 of the Constitution, if the entire amount
of the debt is greater than the income and revenue for such year and
even though the amount is divided into installments payable In a series
of years. Other cases holding that a debt created without the assent
of voters, by a city, and payable annually through a period of years,
was In violation of this section if the total amount of it was more than
the income for the year in which it was contracted, although the
amount maturing each year could be paid by the income of that year,
are, City v. McKenna, 99 Ky. 508, 36 S. W. 518; Beard v. City, 95 Ky.
239, 24 S. W. 872; Knu~per v. City, 109 Ky. 187, 58 S. W. 498; Ramsey
v. City of Shelbyville, 119 Ky. 180, 83 S. W. 116.
The test by which to determine whether or not the indebtedness
exceeds the limit i the full amount that can be raised by a levy. City
of Providence v. The Providence Electric Light Co., 122 Ky. 237, 91 S.
W. 664.
A directly cofttrary interpretation has been adopted by the California court. That state, while having a similar restriction in its Conptitution, has held that contracts which provide for future annual payments are not obnoxious to the provision, if the payment for the current year is within the income and revenue for that year. Higgins v.
San Diego Water Co., 118 Cal. 524, 45 Pac. 824; McBean v..Fresno, 112
Cal. 159, 44 Pac. 358, 31 L. R. A. 794.
With regard to debts incurred by operation of law, or other than
by the voluntary act of the municipality, it has been held, in states having similar restrictions, that such debts are included i4 the prohibition
and, are therefore void. Bernard , Co. v. Knox County, 105 Mo. 382, 16
S. W. 917, 13 L. R. A. 244; Fritch v. Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 83, 93,
47 Pac. 1026; Grand Island d N. W. y. Co. v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45
Pac. 494, 34 L. R. A. 835.
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The obvious purpose of the provision is to force municipalities to
adopt the "pay as you go" plan and with this purpose and constitutional
intent foremost, the Kentucky court has uniformly prevented any attempts of evasion by installment payments. The Kentucky interpretation is also in accord with the general rule of interpretation followed
b states having similar provisions.
C. E. B.

PRIsoNs-IF PRIsoNER's INcARcERATION WAS
FmUXD

LAWFUL AND JAILER

TO USE MEANS TO PREVENT AssAuLT ON HM BY ORGANI=ATION" OF

SURESmS WERE LiABLE.-Plaintiff while incprcerated in a county jail was beaten, bruised, and relieved of his money
and other possessions under the decree of a "kangaroo court." He
alleged that it was the custom of the inmates of the jail to initiate newcomers by an assault and taking of personal effects; that defendant, as
jailer, knew of this custom and by his silence permitted and even encouraged the commission of such acts. This action is to hold the Jailer's sureties responsible in damages. Held: If incarceration was lawful
and jailer failed to use means at his command to prevent the assault
upon the prisoner, by organization of the inmates of the jail, sureties
are liable (Ky. St. Secs. 2226, 2229). Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819,
7 (2nd) S. W. 230.
PRISoNERs, JAILER AND

This case is striking for its novelty, as it brings for the first time,
the operations of a "kangaroo court" to the attention of the court of
last resort in Kentucky. The Kentucky court, however, has repeatedly
held that acts committed by officers, not in the line of their official
duties, impose no liability on sureties. Commonwealth v. Hurt, 23 Ky.
Law Rep. 1171, 64 S. W. 911; Jewel v. Mills, 3 Bush 64; Murrill v. Smith,
3 Dana 463; Jones v. Van Bever, 164 Ky. 80, 174 S. W. 795.
The plaintiff, in this case, seeks to fasten liability on the sureties
under Sections 2226, 2229, Kentucky Statutes, which provide among
other things that a jailer shall receive and keep all persons lawfully
committed unto him and shall treat them with humanity. The adjudicated cases dealing with the acts of "kangaroo courts" are very
few; but the Oklahoma court, Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okl. 545, 49 P. 927, in
holding the jailer's surety liable for the acts of a "kangaroo court"
which he knew to exist said, "If the jailer is aware of such contemplated assault and does not use every reasonable means at his command to prevent it" he breaches his duty to "faithfully perform" and
thereby binds his surety.
In Biggs v. German, 81 Wash. 128, 142 P. 479, the surety was relieved from liability but solely on the ground that the jailer had no
reason to anticipate any maltreatment of the prisoner by the inmates,
while the same jurisdiction in Rberhart v. Murphy, 110 Wash. 168, 188
P. 17, agrees with the Oklahoma court in holding the surety liable for
acts done by inmates of the jail if the jailer might under the circumstances anticipate and prevent such action.
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The above cases seem to indicate a clear and logical inclination of
the courts to regard the existence of such "court" at least with the
knowledge and tacit consent of the Jailer as -a misfeasance in office for
J. C. B.
which the surety is liable.

RArmnos-NoisEs CREATED nq RAnOAD YARDS, SUo

AS SWITCHAns,. BLOwING OFF OF STEAx, AND RINGING or BELLS REsuLTING
IN DIsTURING OF NEARRY REsIDENTS HEDia NOT TO CONSTITuTE A CoxxoN NUIsANcE WHErEE rr WAS Nor SHOWN THAT NoIsEs WERE UNN2cEssAn.-The prosecuting witnesses resided near the defendant's
passenger and freight depot and switching yards. Their testimony
tended to show that between the hours of 10 to 11 p. . and 1 to 3 a.
m. the defendant by the operations in its yards and at its station, such
as switching of cars, blowing off of steam, ringing of bells and other
noises such as shouting of men, created such great noises "thatthe said
witnesses' rest was greatly disturbed, and they were otherwise greatly
annoyed. The practice had only recently been employed for the
alleged purpose of speeding up the delivery of freight to consignees in
Frankfort. The prosecuting witnesses did not prove that such noises
were not necessary but only that if such operations were continued the
noises would result. The motive for suing out the indictment was to
require the defendants to either have the switching done during the
day or at other places, as formerly. The defendant contended that the
old method caused unnecessary delay which could only be remedied
by the present practice. Held: That the defendant company would
not be liable unless it were shown that the noises complained of were'
unreasonable and unnecessary or could be avoided. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 841, 10 (2d) S. W. 461.
xNG or

The theory of the case is that the noises complained of to be actionable must constitute a nuisance, and that such noises could, not constitute a nuisance unless caused by unreasonable and unnecessary use
of force and machinery. That this is based upon the nature of the
business, since a railroad is a necessary element of commerce and the
public well being, and therefore such noises as are only incident to the
reasonable and necessary use are supported by the same reasons which
uphold the right of eminent domain.
The Kentucky rule on this point, which seems to be well settled, is
that in order to uphold the right to prosecute there must be shown reckless, careless or negligent management which results in unreasonable
and unnecessary noises. Eilcoyn v. C., St L. & N. RBy., 141 Ky. 237,
132 S. W. 438; L. & X. Biy. Co. v. Commonwealth, 158 Ky. 773, 166 S. W.
237.
The rule also seems to prevail in a majority of the states. Randall
v. PacificRBy. Co., 65 Mo. 325; Lehaff & Beimran v. Atlantic City Ry. Co.,
19 AtI. (N. J.) 731. However, in the case of Colgate v. N. Y. Ry. Co.,
100 N. Y. .Sup. 650, a different rule was upheld, though the facts were
very similar.. The court there held that such noises in residential dis-
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tricts, unless for the sole purpose of warning, are nuisances, and that
the fact that the railroad was a public utility did not relieve it
The
court also suggested that the railroad either rearrange its schedule or
carry on such operations in a more sparsely settled locality.
The court in the case at bar seems of the opinion that the company
had a right in the street and therefore could operate its trains either
during the day or night, that the only restriction was upon the exercise of reasonable care proportional to such use as it wished to make,
and not upon the extent of the use. In the case of Baltimore d Potomac
By. Co. v.'Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 330, 27 L. Ed. 745, the court
considered at great length the various rules and adopted a rule materially different from that of the case at bar. The court held that where
the legislature grants privileges and powers to such bodies it does not
give therewith the right to exercise such without regard for the private
rights of others with immunity, and further, that there are many acts
done in pursuance of lawful occupations which because of their peculiar
odors and noises are nuisances when carried on in the heart of a city;
and that it is a wise police regulation to restrict such operations for
the furtherance of health and comfort of its inhabitants; and still further that such operations can be carried on outside the city.
W. H. C.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-PURCHASER COULD NOT RECOVER FROM AimING Cor

PwNy DAMAGES FOR POLLUTION OF CREEK RESULTING FROM CONDI-

TIONTS EXISTING WHEN FARM WAS PURCHASED, WHERE CONDrrIONs WERE
OR MIGHT HAVE BEEN KNOW.-At the time the plaintiff purchased tlle
farm there were substances from the mines of the defendant flowing in
the creek which ran through the farm. These substances consisted of
copperas and other deleterious matter which was destructive of crops,
timber and soil and contaminated the water to the extent that it was
unfit for live stock. Held, the plaintiff could not recover damages for
this pollution of the stream because by the use of ordinary care he
could have known of the condition at the time he purchased the farm.
Norton Coal Mining Co. v. Wilkie et al., 224 Ky. 192, 5 (2nd) S. W. 1058.
This decision is based upon the theory that since the trespass or
injury to the land existed at the time the grantee purchased, he received a reduction in price equal to the amount of damages the grantor
recovered from the defendants or could have recovered; therefore he
should not be allowed to recover himself, especially when the injury to
the land is so apparent that anyone who would exercise ordinary prudence could detect it.
The Kentucky rule is stated as follows, "If the placing of an obstruction In a stream causes immediate injury, the cause of action then accrues and is in the then owner of the land. . . .
In. other words,
the cause of action is always in the person who owns the land when
the injury actually occurs." Lexington and Eastern Railway Go. et al.
v. Crain, 182 Ky. 695, 207 S. W. 447. One who purchased lands after
the construction of a permanent railroad embankment cannot recover
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for injuries to his crops due to flooding because it is presumed that he
received a reduction in the purchase price equal to the damage caused
to the land, which damage was paid to the vendor by the trespasser.
Payne v. Smith, 249 S. W. 995, 198 Ky. 564. Also see Fordson Coal Co.
v. Pleasnick, 215 Ky. 794, 287 S. W. 11; Jones v. "Whitaker,141 Ky. 484,
133 S. W. 223.
This rule is also well settled in other jurisdictions. A conveyance
of land does not transfer the grantor's right of action for damages for a
trespass theretofore accruing. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co. v.
Sanitary District of Ohicago, 260 Ill. 423, 103 N. E. 175. The right to
recover damages for the diminished value of the land resulting from a
permanent flooding, does not pass by warranty deed to a subsequent
owner of the land. Irvine v. City of Oelwein, 170 Ia. 659, 150 N. W. 674.
This rule is upheld in Smith v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 22 Ga. App. 572,
86 S. E. 570. Missouri has modified the doctrine to the extent that the
vendee can recover if the trespass has greatly increased since the conveyance. Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S. W. 1102.
New Jersey holds contra to this rule. Ratkewicz v. Kara, 88 N. J. Eq.
201, 102 Atl. 634.
While there are various modifications and some contra holdings
this rule appears to be sound and followed by the majority of the courts.
A. C. R.

